Transcript
  • 00:01    |    
    Initial credits
  • 00:20    |    
    Introduction
  • 01:17    |    
    Henry Manne's contributions to corporate law
  • 02:21    |    
    Inalienability
    • Inalienability rules and citizenship
    • Sale of voting rights
      • Selling one vote or every election's vote
      • Economic analysis of voting privileges
      • Prohibition of selling organs
      • Consequences of giving your vote away
      • Citizenship
      • Interesting inalienable aspects of citizenship
  • 12:32    |    
    Inalienable duties
    • The draft
      • Using the market to provide soldiers
      • What happens if the country is at war? The basic outcome of becoming a soldier is very high
      • Types of military volunteers
        • People with low incomes
        • People who like the military
      • Effects of unskilled people in the armed forces
      • Delinquency and former soldiers
    • Jury duty
      • Opportunity cost
      • How long does jury duty last?
      • Jurors from the market place
      • Creating an alienable duty
      • Voting as an inalienable duty
  • 26:46    |    
    Opportunity costs of voting
    • Moral obligation
    • Why did the writers of the Constitution decide that only landowners could vote?
    • Isn't it immoral to force people to speak their minds about things they don't know?
    • Media's influence on voting opinions
  • 37:34    |    
    Alternatives for selecting soldiers
    • Random selection
    • Markets
    • Assign alienable duties randomly
    • Disadvantages of alienable duties
  • 43:48    |    
    Why should government get involved in enforcing contracts?
    • Game theory answer
      • Stable game theoretical solution
      • Government as enforcer
      • Effect of reputation
    • The Evolution of Cooperation, Robert Axelrod
      • Results of computer contest
      • Does Robert Axelrod refer to Friedrich A. Hayek's works?
      • Isn't there an economic cost to breach of contract?
      • Effects of an inefficient legal system in contract enforcement
    • Importance of court arbitration
    • How do private enforcement firms work?
  • 01:00:25    |    
    Key differences between common and civil law
    • Specific performance
    • Efficient breach
    • House sale example
      • New buyer
      • Increase of transactional costs
      • Possible solutions
      • Refusal to accredit specific performance
    • Penalty clauses
      • Alumni trip to a basketball game
        • Solutions to the problem
        • Reasons for enforcing liquidated damages clause
        • Brand name
        • When does common law enforce penalty clauses?
        • Liquidated damages clause and cost of nonperformance
      • Evaluation of damages by a third party
      • How can you determine the price of the house?
      • Moral statement about promises
  • 01:29:15    |    
    Final credits


Economic Analysis of Law and Public Choice (Part 5)

New Media  | 25 de julio de 1995  | Vistas: 297

About this video

In this lecture, Dr. Michael Krauss examines inalienability and citizenship. He explains that inalienable rights, such as the right to vote, and inalienable duties, like jury duty, do not take opportunity costs into consideration. The alternatives are market systems and the concept of alienable duties. Dr. Krauss mentions that game theory proves that government is necessary to enforce contracts. And finally, he analyzes two key differences between common and civil law: specific performance and penalty clauses.



Credits

Economic Analysis of Law and Public Choice (Part 5)
Dr. Michael Krauss

Universidad Francisco Marroquín
Guatemala, July 25, 1995

New Media - UFM production. Guatemala, January 2009
Conversion and digital editing: Mynor de León; index and synopsis: Christiaan Ketelaar; content revisers: Daphne Ortiz, Jennifer Keller; publication: Mario Pivaral / Carlos Petz


Conferencista

Michael Krauss is a professor of law at George Mason University…