Transcript
  • 00:00    |    
    Initial credits
  • 00:20    |    
    The voting paradox
    • Issues
    • Prediction of a naive constitutional scholar
    • Effects of coalitions
      • First coalition
      • Second coalition
      • Third coalition
      • Misrepresentation of people's will
    • Constitutional law and the legislative agenda
  • 12:26    |    
    The Calculus of Consent, James M. Buchanan
    • Can you efficiently allocate these resources by taxation?
    • Ways of allocating resources
      • Altruism
      • Anarchy
      • Markets
      • Government
    • Public choice and constitutional law
    • Importance of costs and benefits
      • Asymmetric
      • Symmetric
      • Examples
      • Economic waste
  • 21:06    |    
    Lobbyists and interest groups
    • Legislators as supply
    • Interest group as demand
    • Constitutional theory
    • The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson
      • Interest group formation
      • The free rider dilemma
      • Costs and benefits analysis
        • Distributed and concentrated costs and benefits
        • Types of scenarios
    • Mancur Olson's analysis of demand and supply of legislation
      • Dilemma of the ungrateful electorate
      • Avoiding taking hard positions on divisive issues
      • Base closings example
      • Case 1: Distributed cost and distributed benefit
      • Case 2: Concentrated cost and distributed benefit
      • Case 3: Distributed cost and concentrated benefit
      • Case 4: Concentrated cost and concentrated benefit
    • Is there any relationship between the fourth case and private goods?
  • 44:26    |    
    Ronald H. Coase
    • "The Problem of Social Cost", Journal of Law and Economics
    • Difference between social and private cost
      • Social cost of running a locomotive train
      • The internalization thesis
      • Laws that prevent efficient allocation of resources
    • Conflictive situation between a farmer and rancher
      • Problem description
      • Profit margins of farmer and rancher
      • Scenario 1: Underproduction of crops and overproduction of cattle
      • Bargaining space
      • Scenario 2: Internalization of social cost
      • Distributional change of rights
      • Wealth effect
    • Transactional costs
    • Legislation of transactional costs
  • 01:04:56    |    
    Baseball rules and Ronald H. Coase's theorem
    • Empirical hypothesis about baseball
    • Two important baseball rules in 1965
      • Drafts
      • Reserve clause
    • Effects of Coase's theorem
      • Prediction on reserve clause
      • Interpretation
      • How would transaction costs change between players and a team when the reserve clause is optional?
      • Is the value of the contract already a transaction cost?
      • Does the example indicate that the player has an implicit value?
      • What would be the impact when a player accepts a lower contract value?
    • Empirical results
      • Predictions on free agents
      • Examples
      • Rock concert ticket resellers
      • Sunk costs
    • Law prevention on efficient allocation of resources
    • Can the property rights problem in the baseball example be analyzed alongside Coase's idea about liability?
    • Dealing with changes in property rights values
  • 01:36:10.5    |    
    Final credits


Economic Analysis of Law and Public Choice (Part 1)

New Media  | 19 de julio de 1995  | Vistas: 408

In this lecture, Dr. Michael Krauss introduces students to the economic analysis of law and public choice. He discusses the voting paradox, in which the results of a democratic vote do not necessarily represent the popular will. He also explains the four ways of allocating resources: altruism, anarchy, markets, and the government. Dr. Krauss applies Mancur Olson's economic analysis of the supply and demand of legislation to the formation of lobbyists and interest groups. He also explores Ronald H. Coase's ideas on social costs that effectively challenged the prevailing view that social and private costs differ.




Conferencista

Michael Krauss is a professor of law at George Mason University…

IDEAS DE LA LIBERTAD

Nuestra misión es la enseñanza y difusión de los principios éticos, jurídicos y económicos de una sociedad de personas libres y responsables.

Universidad Francisco Marroquín