• 00:01    |    
    Initial credits
  • 00:20    |    
    Conference content
    • Property rights and resource allocation
    • Inalienability
  • 02:38    |    
    Property rights and social benefits
    • One person
    • Two people
    • Three people
    • Four people
    • Five people
    • Six people
    • Seven people
    • Eight people
  • 10:34    |    
    Different social rules
    • Cooperative property
      • Underproduction
      • Altruism
    • Private property
      • Boating fee
      • Workers' salary
      • No risk
      • Calculation of maximum rent
      • Rent the owner of the boat should charge
    • Public property
      • Social total gain
      • Partnership shares
    • Government intervention
      • Lack of incentives for government workers
      • Public and individual interests
      • Negative effects of communal property
      • Effects of complete private property
  • 48:37    |    
    Classification of inalienability rules
    • Who may own?
      • Anyone (a)
      • Only some people (b)
    • How may it be used?
      • Nothing is forbidden and nothing is required (1)
      • Nothing is forbidden and some things are required (2)
      • Some restrictions and nothing is required (3)
      • Some restrictions and everything is required (4)
      • Some restrictions and some things are required (5)
    • How may it be transferred?
      • Pure inalienability (D)
      • Pure property (A)
      • Modified property (B)
      • Modified inalienability (C)
    • Property classifications and examples
      • Inalienable duty (4-D-b)
      • Jury duty
      • Inalienable rights (3-D-b)
      • Right to vote
      • Conditional coercion (4-C-b)
      • Homesteads
      • Modified inalienability (1-C-a)
      • Organ transplants
      • Alienable duty (4-A-a)
      • Conscription
    • Modified inalienability
      • "Market for lemons"
      • Altruism
      • Putting a price on body parts
      • Artificial versus natural limbs
    • Limits on use
      • Driving age restrictions
      • Pilot's license
      • Rules that are under- and overinclusive
      • Minimum age to consume alcohol
    • Coerced use
      • The prisoners' dilemma
        • Description of the dilemma
        • Choices and payoffs
        • Rationality and decision
      • Housing for the poor
      • Do you have a example with private property rights in the prisoner's dilemma?
    • Inalienability and citizenship
      • Rights involving the state and market pressures
      • Argument in favor of alienable voting
      • Allocation of voting power
      • When you talk about vote alienability, are you referring to nonnationals also?
  • 01:38:59    |    
    Final credits

Economic Analysis of Law and Public Choice (Part 4)

New Media  | 24 de julio de 1995  | Vistas: 536

About this video

In this lecture Dr. Michael Krauss continues the economic analysis of law and public choice. Using the example of a simplified society and fishing, he explains that production is not efficient when property rules are absent or when they are based on communal property. Production problems are solved, however, by private property rights. Krauss describes the different types of property rights based on the categories: who may own, how may it be used, and how may it be transferred. He uses examples, including voting rights, jury duty, the military draft, and organ transplants, to illustrate inalienability rules.


Economic Analysis of Law and Public Choice (Part 4)
Dr. Michael Krauss

Universidad Francisco Marroquín
Guatemala, July 24, 1995

A New Media - UFM production. Guatemala, January 2009
Conversion and digital editing: Mynor de León; index and synopsis: Christiaan Ketelaar; content revisers: Daphne Ortiz, Jennifer Keller; publication: Mario Pivaral / Carlos Petz


Michael Krauss is a professor of law at George Mason University…