Transcript
  • 00:01    |    
    Initial credits
  • 00:20    |    
    Introduction
  • 56.5    |    
    Rules for determining damages
  • Tradeoff between potential rules and torts
  • 03:04    |    
    Case 1: n Hadley v. Baxendale(England, 1854)
    • Description of the case
    • Producer of defective film is sued
    • How much would the producer have been sued for in Guatemala?
    • Adapting the case to Guatemala
      • Structure of income and expenses
      • Collecting expenses and lost opportunities
      • How much would be the amount of the lawsuit?
    • Determination of damages
      • Expectation damages
      • Reliance damages
      • Refund
    • Lawsuit possibilities
    • Rationale behind the case
      • Maximum liability
      • Reasonably foreseeable damages
    • Contingency measures (taking two cameras)
    • Analysis of unforeseeable damages
  • 31:15.5    |    
    Case 2: n Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal and Mining Co.(Oklahoma, 1962)
    • Description of the case
    • Garland Coal refuses to move dirt
    • Arguments in the case
    • Should Garland Coal be ordered to pay 0 or ,000?
    • Appellate court ruling
    • Dangers of contract law
    • Penalty costs of contract
  • 40:13    |    
    Case 3: n Jacob and Young v. Kent(New York, 1921)
    • Description of the case
      • Subcontractor's mistake
      • Owner refuses to pay contractor
    • In Guatemalan law would the builder be ordered to pay 0,000?
    • Effect of different market values for pipes
      • Picasso's painting example
      • Different pipe qualities
      • Contract bargaining
      • Specific clauses in the contract
    • Is it or is it not a property right?
    • Differences between cases 2 and 3
      • Importance of contract fulfillment
      • Importance of market price
    • Non-absolute rights
    • Freedom of contract and property rights in cases 2 and 3
    • Hypothetical case: Wrong gasoline in a car tank
  • 01:12:16    |    
    Torts
  • 01:12:41    |    
    Fault and liability
  • 01:13:18.5    |    
    Strict liability and negligence rules
    • Drivers and pedestrians
    • Economic analysis of driver's behavior
      • Speed
      • Benefits
      • Economic cost for pedestrians
      • Social benefit
      • Effect of strict liability rule
      • Driver's payout under strict liability
      • Effect of negligence rule
      • Definition of negligence in economic terms
      • Driver's payout under negligence rule
    • Lessons learned
    • Unilateral torts
    • Payoff for driver relative to amount of care
    • More incentive to provide care under negligence rule
    • Different transaction costs
    • Social cost of the court system
    • What is the effect of no-fault insurance?
  • 01:36:09    |    
    Final credits


Economic Analysis of Law and Public Choice (Part 6)

New Media  | 26 de julio de 1995  | Vistas: 318

About this video

In this lecture, Dr. Michael Krauss explains how damages and liabilities are determined in contract breaches. Economic costs in three famous civil law cases are analyzed: Hadley v. Baxendale (England, 1854) deals with unforeseeable damages; Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal and Mining Co. (Oklahoma, 1962) considers expectation damages; and Jacob and Young v. Kent (New York, 1921) deals with specific contract breaches.  Finally, looking at torts, Dr. Krauss analyzes the differences and similarities between strict liability and negligence rules with an economic analysis of driving speeds—there is a strong incentive to drive more carefully under the negligence rule.

Credits

Economic Analysis of Law and Public Choice (Part 6)
Dr. Michael Krauss

Universidad Francisco Marroquín
Guatemala, July 26, 1995
A New Media - UFM production. Guatemala, July 1995
Conversion and digital editing: Mynor de León; index and synopsis: Christiaan Ketelaar; content reviser: Daphne Ortiz; publication: Mario Pivaral / Carlos Petz


Conferencista

Michael Krauss is a professor of law at George Mason University…