• 00:01    |    
    Opening credits
  • 00:21    |    
    Introduction: Limitations of centrally plan institutions
    • Relationship between information and politics
    • Information institutions
      • Mass media
      • Academic institutions
      • Informal communications
    • Consequences of public opinion on public policy
    • Disadvantages of weak information institutions
    • Purpose of the conference
  • 11:24    |    
    Speculative markets
    • Price patterns
      • Betting markets
      • Betting market mechanism
    • Comparison between speculative markets and expert predictions
    • Examples
      • Presidential elections
      • Political trends in the Middle East
    • Comparison of different predictions
  • 26:54    |    
    Decision markets
    • Conditional probabilities scenarios
    • 2008 Presidential nomination market
  • 33:35    |    
    Development of a new political organization
    • Differentiation of rich and poor countries
    • Biggest problem of government: misinformation and ignorance
    • Efficiency of speculative markets
    • Implementation of betting institution
      • Current political organization
      • New political organization: GDP plus
  • 40:55    |    
    Summary of ideas
  • 42:10    |    
    • What is the difference between speculators and experts?
    • How do we know that betting people have the accurate information?
    • Types of traders on Speculative Markets
      • Wolves
      • Sheep
    • Can betting markets work well in long term predictions?
    • How can better public policies be developed with outside information?
    • What is a bill market?
    • What is the function of congressmen in this new political organization?
    • Will speculative markets change bills more often than the current system and cause political stability?
    • How can this system benefit people that can't bet?
    • How can a market system beat a traditional system of political bills?
    • Do GDP plus needs social and political restrictions?
    • Aren't congressmen currently influenced by the Market? How can you differentiate between congressmen and business people?
    • How can congressmen develop efficient public policies without having the necessary information about something?
    • Prediction of the Internet bubble
    • Can betting markets determine the inaccuracy of opinion polls?
  • 01:12:55    |    
  • 01:13:28    |    
    Final credits

How Decision Markets Work (with emphasis on Iowa Electronic Markets)

24 de octubre de 2007 | Vistas: 1310 |

About this video

The main difficulty in developing efficient public policies is misinformation and false beliefs. The traditional information institutions are the media academics, and informal communications. These institutions have limitations in providing reliable, efficient, useful and enough information to make decisions. Speculative markets base their profits on the prediction of price patterns and are proving to be an efficient information institution. Betting markets have been better and faster predictions than experts because manipulators develop more accurate information. Therefore, speculative and betting markets have to become the central institution on political institutions in order to have effective public policies.


How Decision Markets Work (with emphasis on Iowa Electronic Markets)
Robin Hanson

Business School Building, EN-503
Universidad Francisco Marroquín
Guatemala, October 24th 2007

New Media - UFM production. Guatemala, October 2007
Camera: Manuel Alvarez; digital editing: Adrián Méndez; index and synopsis: Christiaan Ketelaar; publication: Mario Pivaral 


Robin Hanson is an associate professor at George Mason University and…


Nuestra misión es la enseñanza y difusión de los principios éticos, jurídicos y económicos de una sociedad de personas libres y responsables.

Universidad Francisco Marroquín