• 00:00    |    
    Initial credits
  • 00:06    |    
  • 01:00    |    
    Useful concepts and basic ideas
    • Definition of punishment
    • Levels of punishment
    • Punishment in random encounters
    • Rational punishment and its costs
    • Pro-social punishment and its cooperators
    • Rationality and irrationality
    • Quote, n , Herrmann, Thoni & Gachter (2008)
    • Limitations to the experimental data
    • Replications of the experiment around the world
  • 08:33    |    
    Expected punishment
    • Policing the dictators, the first research paper
    • Conclusions: First research paper
    • Inducing efficient conditional cooperation patterns in public goods games, the second research paper
    • Conclusions: Second research paper
  • 17:51    |    
    Punishing other individuals
    • The ultimatum game
    • Experiment interpretation
    • Punishing in experimental games
    • Three papers on punishment
    • Time discount: short and long hypothetical rewards
    • Short and future-minded individuals
    • Experimental results
    • Patient and impatient punishers of free-riders
    • Patient people and level of cooperation
    • Impatient people and level of cooperation
    • Conclusion of the experiment
  • 34:44    |    
    General conclusions
    • Minimum table offer
    • Results
  • 38:03    |    
    Questions and answers section
    • Can punishment be a response to a cultural self-image?
    • Is punishment driven by a sentiment of justice?
    • Does punishment happen in the real world?
    • Does trigger strategy have an influence over punishment?
    • Should beliefs be taken into account in experiments?
    • Comment on data interpretation
    • Comment on lab procedures
    • Punishment vs. lecturing
  • 53:43    |    
    Final credits

Punishment in Experimental Games

New Media  | 20 de febrero de 2014  | Vistas: 2717

Pablo Brañas-Garza describes intriguing findings on punishment behaviors in individuals. Punishment is the infliction of a penalty in retribution for an offense, that can occur at the public, private, institutional or individual levels. In individual punishment, this imposition occurs in random encounters, under the rational caveat that: in order to punish someone, a cost must always be paid. In a social setting, he explains, subjects entitled with a sense of social identity are willing to pay this cost. Punishment, then, becomes a behavior that encourages cooperation among individuals.

Brañas-Garza employs data from 5 real experiments to explore whether subjects punish and anticipate others’ punishment. He concludes that, even in artificial environments, people punish very often, and not always rationally. Punishing behaviours vary according to changes in environment, time availability, efficiency issues, and subjects’ patience levels and willingness to cooperate. As Brañas-Garza suggests, punishment may be a means to coordinate individuals in societies, with careful consideration of the risk of unintended effects.



Nuestra misión es la enseñanza y difusión de los principios éticos, jurídicos y económicos de una sociedad de personas libres y responsables.

Universidad Francisco Marroquín