Transcript
  • 00:00    |    
    Initial credits
  • 00:06    |    
    Introduction by Daniel Houser
  • 00:45    |    
    Economics in the laboratory
  • 00:50    |    
    Vernon Smith's experimental economics
  • 01:26    |    
    Ingredients of an experiment
    • Environment
    • Message space
    • Institutions
  • 03:33    |    
    Experiment mapping process
  • 04:19    |    
    Role of the experimenter
  • 04:51    |    
    Reasons to perform experiments
  • Institutional comparative process
  • 06:22    |    
    Nobel Prize awarded to Vernon Smith
  • 07:11    |    
    Importance of institutional rules
  • How does Vernon Smith define institutions?
  • 09:35    |    
    Significance of institutions
    • Dynamic auction against posted offer
    • Institutions matter
  • 13:40    |    
    Experimental theory testing
  • 14:37    |    
    Duhem-Quine thesis
  • Vernon Smith's view on the thesis
  • 18:18    |    
    Flat maximum
    • Glenn Harrison's thesis
    • Vernon L. Smith and James M. Walker's thesis
  • 21:45    |    
    Causes of a theory's failure
  • 22:14    |    
    Empirical regularities
  • 22:46    |    
    Double-auction experiments
  • 23:31    |    
    Policy proposal evaluation
  • 24:06    |    
    Anticipation of opportunity costs
  • 26:33    |    
    Financial incentives
    • Machiavellian tendencies
    • Monetary incentives
  • 33:30    |    
    Reward structure design
  • 34:52    |    
    Motivations to participate in experiments
    • Ultimatum games result
    • Experimenter demand effects
  • 39:36    |    
    Use of neutral language
  • 40:11    |    
    Personal exchange experiments
  • 41:30    |    
    Helpfulness of incentives
  • 42:35    |    
    Trolley experiment
    • Pattern of results
    • Plausible deniability
    • Ming Hsu's study on the consequences of a trolley-type problem
  • 52:35    |    
    Importance of instructions
    • Linear public goods game
    • Nash equilibrium
    • Accurate comprehension of instructions
    • Dictator game example
  • 01:01:38    |    
    Deception
    • What do you mean by deception?
    • How can you study deception?
    • Effects of lying in the experiment's perception
    • Study of the impact of deception on subject pools
    • Case-by-case deception
    • Relationship between fairness and cheating
  • 01:10:09    |    
    Internal review boards (IRB)
    • Greg Burns' study on the dog brain
    • What does IRB stand for?
    • What type of members does an IRB have?
  • 01:14:52    |    
    Methodological issues of an experiment
    • Gary Becker's remarks on controlled environments
      • Parallelism in the decision taking process
      • Study on dictator game experiment
      • Determinants of a individual's decision
    • Quotes, n , Colin Camerer
  • 01:26:10    |    
    Final words
  • 01:26:19    |    
    Final credits


Experimental Methods (Part I) Economics in the Laboratory

New Media  | 23 de octubre de 2012  | Vistas: 505

As economics become a science that continuously explains and predicts human action and interaction, Daniel Houser sets the foundational principles of economic experiments, sharing the situations that take place in a laboratory when trials are being carried out.

He shares basic elements that must be present in the process, such as environments, outcomes, information, messages, and production; and also tells about the different types of experiments that can be performed, about the role of the experimenter to control and observe, the significance of incentives and the fact that credibility and extrapolation are questioned in the trials.

Houser comments on how laboratory experiments make the study of complex environments feasible; nevertheless, states that they differ from the actions taken within a natural setting, establishing though, that the process by which decisions are made, should be the same in both surroundings.




Conferencista

Daniel Houser is chairman of the Department of Economics and director…